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FOR DIRK STRUIK ON HIS 100TH BIRTHDAY 
Between 1837 and 1842 at least six mathematicians and philosophers, writing in French, 
English, and German, and working independently of one another, introduced istinctions 
between two kinds of probability. Although the grounds, contents, and implications of these 
distinctions differed significantly from author to author, all revolved around a philosophical 
distinction between "objective" and "subjective" which had emerged ca. 1840. It was this 
new philosophical distinction which permitted the revisionist probabilists to conceive of the 
possibility of "objective probabilities," which would have been an oxymoron for classical 
probabilists uch as Jakob Bernoulli and Pierre Simon Laplace. Without relinquishing the 
rigid determinism of the classical probabilists, the revisionists were nonetheless able to grant 
chance an objective status in the world by opposing it to the subjective variability of the 
mind. © 1994 Academic Press, Inc. 
Zwischen 1837 und 1842 haben mindestens sechs Mathematiker and Philosophen, die auf 
Franzrsisch, Englisch und Deutsch geschrieben haben und die unabh/ingig von einander 
gearbeitet haben, Unterscheidungen zwischen zweierlei Arten von Wahrscheinlichkeiten 
eingefiihrt. Obwohl die Begriindungen, Inhalte und Implikationen dieser Unterscheidungen 
sehr verschiedend unter den Autoren waren, waren alle auf eine philosophische Unterschei- 
dung zwischen "objektive" und "subjektiv," die rum 1840 erschien, zentriert. Diese philo- 
sophische Unterscheidung hat es ermfglicht, dab die revisionistische Probabilisten die M~3g- 
lichkeit von "objektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten" zulassen konnten--eine Mrglichkeit die 
for die klassische Probabilisten wie Jakob Bernoulli und Pierre Simon Laplace ein Wider- 
spruch an sich gewesen w~ire. Ohne den strengen Determinismus der klassischen Probabilis- 
ten aufzugeben waren die revisionistischen Probabilisten bereit Zufall einen objektiven Status 
in der Welt zu verleihen, als Gegengewicht der subjektiven Variabilit~it des Geistes. © 1994 
Academic Press. Inc. 
Entre 1837 et 1842 au moins six mathrmaticiens et philosophes, 6crivant en fran~ais, 
anglais, et allemand, et travaillant indrpendamment l'un de l'autre, ont introduit distinctions 
entre deux esp~:ces de probabilitr. Quoique les raisons, qualitrs et implications de ces 
distinctions e different beaucoup entre les auteurs, elles tournaient toutes autour d'une 
distinction philosophique entre "objectif" et "subjectif" qui apparut ca. 1840. C'rtait cette 
nouvelle distinction philosophique qui permit les probabilistes revisionnistes de concevoir 
de la possibilit6 des "probabilitrs objectives," ce qui aurait 6t~ une alliance de mots pour 
les probabilistes classiques comme Jacques Bernoulli et Pierre Simon Laplace. Sans aban- 
donner le drterminisme strict des probabilistes classiques, les revisionnistes pourraient 
* I thank Berna Eden for drawing my attention to the diversity of the frequentist tradition in 
probability theory, and Joan Richards for pointing out the difficulties of a straightforward empiricist 
reading of Robert Leslie Ellis's works on the foundations of probability theory. 
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donner au hasard une condition objective dans le monde, en l'opposant ~ la variabilit6 
subjective de l'esprit. © 1994 Academic Press, Inc. 
MSC 1991 subject classifications: 01A55, 60-03 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1843 the French mathematician, philosopher, and economist A. A. Cournot 
wrote of"the double sense of probability, which at once refers to a certain measure 
of our knowledge, and also to a measure of the possibility of things [possibilit~ 
des choses] independently of the knowledge we have of them." He christened 
these two distinct senses "with the epithets of subjective and objective, which 
were necessary inorder for me to distinguish radically [between] the two meanings 
of the term probability ''~ [9, 4-5]. Between 1837 and 1843 at least six authors-- 
Simron-Denis Poisson, Bernard Bolzano, Robert Leslie Ellis, Jakob Friedrich 
Fries, John Stuart Mill, and Cournot--approaching the topic as mathematicians 
and philosophers, writing in French, German, and English, and apparently working 
independently, made similar distinctions between the probabilities of things and 
the probabilities of our beliefs about things. Some, though not all, attached the 
terms "objective" and "subjective" to the two kinds of probability they were at 
pains to pull apart. All warned against he dangers of ignoring such distinctions 
in the application of mathematical probability, but they did not all agree on exactly 
where the dangers lay--the probability of judgments? the probability of causes? 
the Law of Large Numbers? Nor did they agree on exactly how to draw the 
distinction between the two kinds of probability, or even to what kind of events 
or entities probabilities could properly be said to apply. 
In this essay I examine not the whys but the hows of this explosion of concern 
among probabilists ca. 1840. 2 That is, I will be concerned not with why ca. 1840 
so many authors became simultaneously exercised about what mathematical prob- 
ability could and could not mean, 3but rather with how they went about making 
such distinctions. More specifically, I will be concerned with how such diverse 
arguments and examples could eventually, by the late 19th century, converge 
upon the same terminology of "objective" and "subjective" probabilities. What 
i Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. 
2 Although Jakob Friedrich Fries's Versuch einer Kritik der Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrech- 
nung (1842) certainly belongs to this cluster of works, I do not discuss it in this paper. Fries's account 
of probability theory is embedded in an elaborate Kantian framework and must be set in the context 
of his other, extensive writings on the philosophy of the natural sciences and applied mathematics in 
order to appreciate its relation to his understanding of the meaning of objective and subjective. This 
is an undertaking which would require at least a paper in its own right. For a summary of those aspects 
relating to statistical regularities, ee [37, 85-86]. 
3 There already exists an historical literature on the "why" problem: [37, 77-86] on the influence 
of social statistics and criticisms of the probability of causes, [12, 210-224, 370-386] on the influence 
of the decline of associationist psychology and criticism of the probability of judgments, and [25, 
95-98] on the influence of Joseph Fourier's Recherches tatistiques ur la ville de Paris (1829) on 
Poisson in particular. 
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had these terms come to mean in the early decades of the 19th century, and 
why were they so eminently available to probabilists trained in such diverse 
mathematical nd philosophical traditions, and with such contrasting visions of 
probability theory and its proper domain of applications? I want to argue three 
claims: first, that it was ca. 1830 that the words "objectivity" and "subjectivity" 
emerged in French, German, and English with new meanings that resonated with 
the new distinctions of the probabilists; second, that the probabilists were far 
from unanimous about the grounds for and the implications of their distinctions; 
and third, that the novelty of their distinctions lay not in any unified view about 
either the meanings or applications of mathematical probability, but rather in a 
new ontology of chance events that made it possible to understand "objective 
probability" as something other than a contradiction i  terms. 
THE NEW MEANINGS OF THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE 
Cournot wrote that it was "the example of Jakob Bernoulli" that had stiffened 
his resolve to import the "metaphysical" language of objectivity and subjectivity 
into mathematics, and Bernoulli was indeed the first mathematical probabilist o 
use the terms "objective" and "subjective" in relation to probabilities. However, 
the sense in which he used them diverged significantly from Cournot's usage. In 
the opening passages of Part IV of the Ars conjectandi (1713) it is certainty 
(certitudo), not probability, which Bernoulli modifies by objectivO: "All things 
under the sun, past, present, and future, in themselves and objectively [in se & 
objective] always have the greatest certainty." In contrast, all probabilities, de- 
fined as "degrees of certainty that differ from [certainty] as part to whole" [3, 
239], are incorrigibly subjective just because they fall short of total certainty. 
God's knowledge is certain and therefore objective; human knowledge is objective 
only insofar as it is certain. Galileo had daringly claimed that human knowledge 
about mathematics "equals the Divine in objective certainty [certezza obiecttiva]" 
because it is knowledge of necessity [21,129]; Bernoulli similarly argued that causal 
knowledge of eclipses partook of the same necessity and therefore objectivity [3, 
240]. Given this understanding ofobjectivity as certainty based on an understand- 
ing of necessary causes, "objective probabilities" would have been an oxymoron. 
We have recourse to probabilities when forced by our ignorance to traffic in 
contingencies rather than the objective necessity of things in themselves. For 
classical probabilists from Bernoulli through Pierre-Simon de Laplace, probabili- 
ties were officially subjective in Bernoulli's sense, figments of human ignorance 
for which an omniscient deity, or even a well-informed super-calculator, would 
have no need. 
This does not imply that classical probabilists did not regularly make use of 
what after 1840 came to be known as objective probabilities. As Ian Hacking 
has shown, from the earliest stirrings of mathematical probability the subjective 
understanding of probabilities coexisted side by side with a conception of probabili- 
ties derived from observed frequencies (e.g., mortality statistics) or physical con- 
stitution (e.g., the symmetry of coins and dice) [24, 11-17]. Bernoulli himself, in 
the theorem which crowned the Ars conjectandi, aimed to connect the probabilities 
HM 21 OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES 333 
of reasonable xpectation with the actual frequencies of all manner of events, 
from wine harvests to storms. Eighteenth-century probabilists slid easily between 
sense of probabilities rooted in states of mind and in states of the world. Insofar 
as they remarked at all upon the gap between these senses, philosophers and 
mathematicians relied upon the associationist psychology of Locke, Hartley, 
Hume, and Condillac to correlate experience with expectation [12, 191-210]. 
Classical probabilists did not lack for applications of either subjective or objective 
probabilities inour sense, but they did lack any felt need to draw a sharp distinction 
between the two, much less a need to describe that distinction in the language of 
"objective" and "subjective," for them so redolent of late scholasticism. 
For Galileo, Bernoulli, and other 17th-century writers the terminology of the 
objective and subjective still bore some of the marks of its 14th-century coinage 
in the works of Duns Scotus, William of Occam, and other nominalist Schoolmen 
on the status of universals and particulars. The objective in this context referred 
to the objects of thought, and the subjective to objects in themselves [35, A.2.a]. 
This (to modern ears) inverted sense survived well into the 18th century; witness, 
for example, the entry for "Objective/objectivus" in the 1728 edition of Chamber's 
Dictionary: "Hence a thing is said to exist OBJECTIVELY, objectivO, when it 
exists no otherwise than in being known; or in being an Object of the Mind" [6, 
649]. The meanings of the terms had, however, already branched and crisscrossed 
in the 17th century in both Latin and in various vernaculars, although "objective" 
still generally modified thoughts rather than external objects. A famous example 
can be found in the Meditationes (1641) of Ren6 Descartes, in which he contrasted 
the "objective reality" of an idea--whether it represents its cause by perfection 
and/or content--with its "formal reality"--whether it corresponds to anything 
external to the mind [15, 40-42; 8, 136-137; 33] By the mid-18th century certain 
metaphysical texts drew an objective/subjective distinction along the lines of 
things in themselves versus thoughts, but even in such cases the mentalist associa- 
tions were still strong: "One divides the truth into the objective or metaphysical 
[objektivische oder metaphysische], which is nothing other than the reality or 
possibility of the object itself . . .  [a]nd into the subjective or logical [subjektive 
oder logikalische], which is truth in a really existing mind . . .  All objective truth 
is thus in the divine mind a subjective truth" [11, 95]. 
But by the time these lines were published, the terminology of objectivity and 
subjectivity had an archaic and pedantic ring to it, and was confined to obscure, 
mostly German treatises on metaphysics and logic. In addition to its technical 
scholastic and theological ("God is our objective beatitude" [16]) senses, the most 
common eighteenth-century definition is the "objective" lens ("object glass") of 
a microscope or telescope. A quick survey of major dictionaries in French, English, 
and German reveals that the words surface again with something like their familiar 
modern meaning only in the 1830s--somewhat earlier in German. Already in 1820 
a German dictionary defines Objektivitiit as "relation to an external object" and 
Subjektiv as "personal, inner, inhering in us, in opposition to objective" [27], and 
numerous editions of the Grimm brothers' etymological dictionary traced the 
newer philosophical senses of both objektiv and subjektiv directly to Kant [22; 
334 LORRAINE DASTON HM 21 
23]. The early French entries were equally pointed in linking the new meaning of 
objectifas that "which is outside the thinking subject; all that is real and not at 
all ideal" with "new systems of philosophy" [4]. Littrr's etymological dictionary 
of 1863 was still more explicit in crediting the "new sense" of objectifas "every 
idea which comes from objects exterior to the mind" as "due to the philosophy 
of Kant"  [30]. 
English-language dictionaries were somewhat sluggish in picking up newfangled 
philosophical meanings, tending to assimilate them to 18th-century logical defini- 
tions .4 But there is independent li erary evidence that philosophical winds blowing 
from Kant's Krnigsberg also carried the new usage of "objective" and "subjec- 
tive" to British readers. The poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge seems to have reintro- 
duced the term back into general English usage in 1817, in the context of an 
exposition of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophical systems he had learned about 
during a stay in Germany: "Now the sum of all that is merely OBJECTIVE we 
will henceforth call NATURE, confining the term to its passive and material sense, 
as comprising all the phenomena by which its existence is made known to us. On 
the other hand the sum of all that is SUBJECTIVE, we may comprehend in the 
name SELF or INTELLIGENCE.  Both conceptions are in necessary antithesis" 
[7, 1:174]. By 1856 Thomas De Quincey could remark of the word "objective" 
that "[t]his word, so nearly unintelligible in 1821, so intensely scholastic, and . . .  
yet, on the other hand, so indispensable toaccurate thinking, and to wide thinking, 
has since 1821 become too common to need any apology" [14, 265]. 
To summarize: although a philosophical distinction between "objective" and 
"subjective" dated back to the 14th century, the terms languished in the late 17th 
and 18th centuries. Revived by Kant in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781, 1787), 
which breathed wholly new meanings into them, 5 they became entrenched in 
general usage in German, French, and English in the period 1820-1840. But by 
1840 this usage bore almost as little resemblance to the Kantian philosophy which 
had resurrected the terms as to the scholastic philosophy which had created them. 
For Kant, "object" (Gegenstand) and "objective validity" (objektive Giiltigkeit) 
were quite distinct concepts, and it is the latter, understood as the synthetic a
priori categories uch as time, space, and causation that are preconditions for 
experience, which undergirds Kant's own distinction between the objective and 
subjective [28, 251-252, A201-202/B246-247; 1, 134-155]. Just how remote this 
usage is from our own is made clear by Kant's regular pairing of the "subjective" 
4 Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language defines one sense of "objective" from 1755 
onwards as "[b]elonging to the object; contained in the object," a definition repeated verbatim (along 
with the illustrative quotation from Isaac Watts's Logick (1724)) by several other English-language 
dictionaries until ate in the 18th century, e.g., [34]. Some mid-19th-century entries incorporate he 
new philosophical opposition of "objective" to "subjective," but preserve the 1724 quotation, e.g., 
[41]. 
5 In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant discusses "probability [Wahrscheinlichkeit]" as well as 
the nature of the "objective" and "subjective," but the two discussions remain wholly unconnected. 
Moreover, Kant uses "probability" ina nonquantitative, almost archaic sense, reminiscent of classical 
treatises on rhetoric. Compare, for example, [28,705-706, A775/B803] with [2, 2:1730, 1094b19-28]. 
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with the "merely empirical." Yet the usage enshrined by 1840, despite its bows 
in the direction of the "new philosophy," drew the distinction between an "objec- 
tive" external reality independent of all minds and "subjective" internal states 
dependent upon individual minds. This was the meaning of the distinction which 
crystallized in French, German, and English in the 1830s and upon which almost 
all of the distinctions between two kinds of probability made ca. 1840 relied, even 
if they did not invoke the newly fashionable terminology of the objective and 
subjective. 
A PLURALITY OF DISTINCTIONS 
An arresting temporal and conceptual coincidence links the emergence both of 
the new philosophical distinction between objective and subjective realms, and 
of various distinctions between two kinds of probability. But it would be rash to 
conclude to the existence of any straightforward connection between the philo- 
sophical and probabilistic distinctions: some of the probabilists--such as Cournot 
and Bolzano--explicitly couched their distinctions in the new philosophical termi- 
nology, but others did not. Moreover, even those who did speak the new language 
of objective and subjective probabilities did not agree with one another as to what 
these were. Upon closer inspection the relationship between the philosophical 
and probabilistic distinctions eems to be one of a shared ontology, one which 
seems to have become not only thinkable but self-evident only in the 1830s. This 
ontology not only carved up the world into what was inside and outside human 
minds--Descartes had already done as much--but also (pace Enlightenment ratio- 
nalists) located reality and truth in the "outside" realm of objects, and (pace 
Enlightenment empiricists) further insisted on the mismatch not only between 
world and mind, but also among the minds of different individuals. That is, the 
new subjectivity was a threat o knowledge not only because it was insufficiently 
faithful to the reality of objects, but also because its contents and dictates varied 
from person to person. In order to understand how this ontology shaped the 
probabilistic distinctions, we must briefly examine the latter. 
What is most striking upon a first composite reading of the works of Poisson, 
Cournot, Bolzano, Ellis, and Mill is the sharp divergence of motivations, formula- 
tions, and consequences of the distinctions they each draw between kinds of 
probability. Poisson, eager to rescue the mathematical theory of the probability 
of judgments from attacks recently launched against i by mathematicians, philoso- 
phers, and politicians [12, 342-369], and impressed by the criminal statistics 
recently gathered by the French Ministry of Justice [38, 186-194; 25, 87-104], 
emphasized the empirical foundations of probability theory. Bernoulli's theorem 
was but a special case of the Law of Large Numbers (Poisson's original coinage), 
which was a "general and incontestable fact, resulting from experience" of both 
physical and moral phenomena, nd the "base of all applications of the calculus 
of probabilities" [36, 12]. Yet Poisson reserved the traditional term "probability" 
for its traditional definition as "the reason we have to believe that [an event] will 
or will not occur" [36, 30], letting "chance" designate "events in themselves and 
independent of the knowledge we have of them" [36, 31]. So, for example, the 
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"chances" of heads or tails for a given coin are unlikely to be equal because of 
the physical asymmetries ofall such objects, but the "probability" is nonetheless 
equal because we know nothing about the coin's constitution. For Poisson, both 
the "chance" of underlying causes and the "probability" of our ignorance were 
equally legitimate interpretations of what it was that mathematical probabilities 
measured. He proposed to evict from mathematical probability theory neither the 
probabilitds of belief, nor any of the much-maligned applications, such as the 
probabilities of causes and judgments, which depended on them. Clarification 
alone would suffice. All confusion and paradox would disappear, Poisson was 
confident, if probabilists would only learn to differentiate between probabilit~ and 
chance. 
Cournot was considerably more severe about restricting both legitimate applica- 
tions and interpretations of mathematical probabilities. Although he professed in 
his preface to be in total agreement with Poisson's distinction (at which Cournot 
had arrived independently) [9, 5-6], and although e defended the probability of 
judgments [9, 231], Cournot sharply criticized Condorcet and Laplace's Bayesian 
approach to the probability of causes, preferring an"  experimental determination" 
based on Bernoulli's Theorem [9, 106]. The "subjective probabilities" based on 
equal ignorance of outcomes were fit only for the "frivolous use of regulating the 
conditions of a bet" [9, 11 I, 288], and were moreover the "cause of a crowd of 
equivocations [which] have falsified the idea one ought to have of the theory of 
chances and of mathematical probabilities" [9, 59]. What Cournot held against 
subjective probabilities was not so much that they were not empirical givens as 
that they varied "from one intelligence to another, according to their capacities 
and the data with which they are provided" [9, 106]. Far from equating objective 
probabilities with frequencies tout court as John Venn was later to do [40, 90], 
Cournot exhorted statisticians topurify the "immediate data of observation" from 
all features that depend "solely on the point of view in which the observer is 
situated," calling on theory and principles to help transcend mere "compilations 
of facts and figures" [9, 125]. 
None of the probabilists in this group, in fact, went so far as to identify probabili- 
ties baldly with frequencies, although John Stuart Mill came the closest in his 
attacks on the classical theory of probability as "ignorance...  coined into science" 
by the mere manipulation of numbers 6 [31, 8:1142]. He roundly rejected both the 
probabilities of causes and judgments, condemning them for having made the 
calculus of probabilities "the opprobrium of mathematics." He further claimed 
that if the theory was to be profitably turned to any "scientific purpose," its 
foundations must rest on "the utmost attainable amount of positive knowledge" 
[31, 7:539]. Ideally, that knowledge would be of causes, for frequencies alone 
"can give rise to no other induction than that per enumerationem simplicem; and 
the precarious inferences derived from this" [31, 7:542]. 
6 Mill's Logic went through seven editions during his lifetime: 1843, 1846, 1851, 1856, 1862, 1865, 
1868. I here quote from the seventh edition, insofar as it agrees with the first edition. When the two 
diverge, I have indicated this by adding "1843" to the reference. 
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Still less reliable were estimates of equiprobability based on equal ignorance 
about possible outcomes. In the first 1843 edition of his Logic, Mill had dismissed 
all such applications of the Principle of Indifference as so much algebraic alchemy, 
transmuting base ignorance into the true metal of knowledge [31, 8:1141]. But in 
later editions, under the influence of John Herschel [39], Mill grudgingly conceded 
that "as a question of prudence" we might rationally assume that "one supposition 
is more probable to us than another supposition," and even bet on that assumption 
"if we have any interest at stake" and if we were in the desperate (and rare) 
situation of having no relevant experience whatsoever [31, 7:535-536]. 
Note that Mill's "scientific" probabilities did not precisely coincide with either 
Poisson's chance or Cournot's probabilit(s objectives. The latter referred to real 
states of the world, independent ofall human knowledge, whereas Mill's probabili- 
ties, "scientific" or not, were always based upon experience, more or less com- 
plete, and therefore upon our knowledge: "We must remember that the probability 
of an event is not a quality of the event itself, but a mere name for the degree of 
ground which we, or some one else, have for expecting it" [31, 7: 535]. That 
knowledge coincided with things as they are only when it was full, causal knowl- 
edge. Despite his loud and repeated calls for probabilities founded on experience, 
Mill curiously remained the most traditional of the revisionists in his interpretation 
of all probabilities as epistemic. 
Neither Mill nor Robert Leslie Ellis, the other British probabilist in my ca. 1840 
sample, used the word "objective" in relation to the probabilities of experience. 
The omission perhaps reflects nothing more than the slight British lag-time in the 
reception of the new, pseudo-Kantian use of the word: Mill did use the word by 
1863 in the context of the alleged "objective reality" of moral obligations [32, 
43], and Ellis invoked the "merely subjective" character of secondary qualities 
in his 1857 introduction to the philosophical works of Francis Bacon [20, 75, 
80-81]. Yet in Mill's case there may have been more principled reasons to deny 
merely epistemic probabilities, even those grounded in experience, an accolade 
reserved for things and events in the world. Mill believed these latter to be 
absolutely certain: "Every event is in itself certain, not probable" [31, 7:535]. 
The case of Ellis is considerably more convoluted. His essay occasionally 
glimmers with bits of neo-Kantian vocabulary, as when he insists on the importance 
of "d priori truths" and "the ideal elements of knowledge," as well as on the 
incompatibility of the classical theory of probabilities with "the views of the nature 
of knowledge, generally adopted at present ''7 [18, 1, 6]. Although in later articles 
on the Method of Least Squares Ellis seconded Mill's claim "that mere ignorance 
[here, of the specific law of error which applies for a given set of observations] 
is no ground for any inference whatever. Ex nihilo nihir' [19,325], his 1842 essay 
7 The language of "ideal elements" is redolent of William Whewell's faintly Kantian Philosophy of 
the Inductive Sciences (1840), and it is quite possible that Whewell's views influenced Ellis directly 
through their association at Trinity College, Cambridge, where Whewell was appointed Master in 
1841, and Ellis a fellow in 1840. 
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on the foundations of probability theory was a scathing critique of at least one 
kind of empiricism, the sensationalist philosophy of Condillac, because it "rejects 
all reference to d priori truths as such" [18, I]. This would hardly have sat well 
with Mill's steadfast opposition to all a priori truths, even in mathematics and 
logic [31, 7:224-251]. Ellis, in contrast, argued that Bernoulli's theorem was not 
even the result of a mathematical deduction, much less a fact of experience in 
Poisson's sense. Rather, it was an a priori truth, established by "an appeal to 
consciousness" that revealed the impossibility of judging otherwise [18, 1-2]. 
Ellis insisted that judgments of probability were nonetheless "founded, not on 
the fortuitous and varying circumstances of each trial, but on those which are 
permanent--on what is called the nature of the case" [18, 3]. But what was 
permanent was the "fundamental axiom" that in the long run "the action of 
fortuitous causes disappears," an axiom supplied by neither mathematics nor 
experience but rather by "the mind itself, which is ever endeavouring to introduce 
order and regularity among the objects of its perceptions" [18, 3]. 
Ellis's talk of mind was not about mere psychology, and he resisted the sugges- 
tion that probabilities were "the measure of any mental state." Rather, they 
properly referred to "the number of ways in which a given event can occur, or 
the proportional number of times it will occur on the long run" [18, 3]. Note 
Ellis's cautious deployment of "can" and "will": probabilities cannot be simply 
read off of observed frequencies. The objections Ellis leveled against Laplace's 
"law of succession" and the probability of causes [ 12,277-279J--namely, that the 
definition of what constituted the next event in a series of observations depended 
crucially on a judgment of similarity according to "a point of view" [18, 4-5]--are 
equally devastating for every attempt o gather statistics. Ellis did not so much 
condemn the dependence of probability judgments "on the mind which contem- 
plates [an event]" as require the specification of viewpoint. What Cournot would 
have dismissed as the incorrigible subjectivity of the observer's particular perspec- 
tive, Ellis saw as a necessary component of all valid probability judgments, which 
even "the most perfect acquaintance with the nature of the case" could not do 
without. 
Bernard Bolzano's distinction between "real or objective [wirkliche oder objek- 
tire]" and "apparent or merely subjective [vermeintliche oder blofl subjektive]" 
probabilities trayed farthest of all from statistical frequencies. For Bolzano, 
probabilities measure the relationship between propositions, not events [5, 3:274, 
sect. 317]: the relation between the number of cases in which propositions A, B, 
C, D . . . .  are true, and the number of cases in which A, B, C, D . . . .  together 
with the additional proposition M are true can be represented by a fraction which 
equals one when M can be deduced from A, B, C, D . . . .  [5, 2:171-173, sect. 
161]. If the propositions A, B, C, D . . . .  are all true, then the probability is 
"objective"; if some are false, then it is "subjective" [5, 3:266-267, sect. 317]. 
Both objective and subjective probabilities are judgments made by a "certain 
thinking being"; the objective/subjective distinction does not apply to probabilities 
as they relate to propositions in se, regardless of whether they are true or false, 
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or whether a thinking being can judge them to be so [5, 3:264, sect. 317]. That is, 
both objective and subjective probabilities are relative to a thinking mind, which 
can be objectively certain because the propositions it holds to be true are indeed 
so, or subjectively certain, because it mistakes false propositions for true. For 
God all probabilities are objective, because all that the divine mind holds to be 
certain is also true [5, 3:264, sect. 317]. For Bolzano, probability remained a 
measure of certainty, as it had been for the classical probabilists. But whereas 
they had considered probability immiscible with the objective judgments of God, 
Bolzano reconciles probability to even divine objectivity. 
Bolzano was quite aware that his usage of "objective" with respect to a thinking 
subject could be attacked as Pickwickian, for by 1837 the objective was usually 
"understood as only that which can be thought [to be] without any relation to a 
subject" [5, 3:272, sect. 317]. But he defended his terminology by noting that 
rival candidates for the title "objective probabilities," such as the probabilities 
in games of chance, in fact rest upon states of knowledge that might in time be 
improved, so that eventually probabilities might become certainties, or at least 
change their value [5, 3:272, sect. 317]. Nor was Bolzano content with a distinction 
between quantitative and "philosophical" probabilities, of the sort Cournot elabo- 
rated in his later work [10, 1:71-101], for the boundary between the two seemed 
to him "often very subjective and variable" [5, 3:274, sect. 317]. 
THE OBJECTIVITY OF CHANCE IN A DETERMINISTIC WORLD 
Even this briefest of surveys suffices to show how divergent he views of the 
ca. 1840 cluster of revisionist probabilists were on almost every significant point. 
All attacked some aspect of classical probability theory (usually making a target 
of some passage in Laplace's work), but not the same aspect. Poisson hoped to 
rescue the probability of judgments from certain pernicious assumptions; Cournot 
rejected the probability of causes; Mill lambasted both; Ellis challenged the mathe- 
matical demonstration f Bernoulli' stheorem and Laplacean error theory; Bolzano 
objected to the application of probabilities to events rather than propositions. 
Their attitudes toward the relationship between probability and experience were 
similarly various. Mill insisted that "scientific" probabilities be anchored in the 
experience of causes or observed frequencies, but retained the contrast between 
the probabilities of the mind and the certainties of events; Cournot cautioned that 
probabilities derived from frequencies must be refined by the regulative principles 
of rationality; Ellis emphasized the role of those regulative principles in defining 
a reference class in securing the foundations of the mathematical theory such 
as Bernoulli's theorem; Poisson counted the Law of Large Numbers (of which 
Bernoulli's theorem was a special case) as an observational fact and the basis of 
all applications of mathematical probability, but nonetheless granted the probabi- 
lit~s of belief equal if separate status with the chances of events in themselves; 
Bolzano protested that probabilities were not about events at all, although they 
could be altered by advances in knowledge. Given this Babel of voices, it is 
tempting to conclude that these writers, far from all simultaneously arriving at 
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the same distinction between kinds of probabilities, were not in agreement about 
anything. 
Yet there is a common theme which unites this cluster of ca. 1840 revisionists, 
and it is one that bears directly on the new meanings of "objective" and "subjec- 
tive" that emerged at approximately the same time. Although all insisted on 
the principle of universal causation and the complete determinism of events in 
themselves, they nonetheless also carved out a place for chance in the world 
rather than in the mind. That is, in their writings, chance became objective without 
for one moment admitting the existence of genuine randomness. This was a position 
that would have been inconceivable for the classical probabilists, for whom objec- 
tivO, in the words of Jakob Bernoulli, was synonymous with certainty and neces- 
sity, and for whom chance, in the words of Abraham De Moivre, "can neither 
be defined nor understood: nor can any Proposition concerning itbe either affirmed 
or denied, excepting this one, 'That it is a mere word' " [13,253]. 
The symbiosis between determinism and classical probability theory was a 
deep and enduring one. What the revisionist probabilists did was not so much 
to abolish that alliance as to reinterpret i . With one crucial exception, all the 
elements of their reinterpretation were available in the writings of the classical 
probabilists, particularly in those of Laplace. These elements were a reaffirma- 
tion of a seamless causal order which determined all events necessarily, and 
a perturbational model of chance as the superimposition of weak, sporadic 
causes upon the action of strong, constant ones. At the same time--and this 
was the novelty--the revisionists opposed a stable objective order to a variable 
subjective one. 
The revisionist probabilists wholeheartedly embraced the ironclad determinism 
famously set forth by Laplace in the Essai philosophique sur les probabilit~s 
(1814): "All events, even those which because of their smallness do not seem to 
hold to the great laws of nature, are a consequence of them as necessary as the 
revolutions of the sun" [29, vi]. But whereas Laplace and other classical probabi- 
lists since Bernoulli had concluded that mathematical probabilities must therefore 
measure degrees of belief, the revisionist probabilists did not draw this conclusion. 
Not that they were any less staunch in their allegiance to universal causation than 
Laplace had been: Mill elevated the "law of universal causation" to "the rigorous 
certainty and universality" of geometric truths [31, 7:325]; Cournot proclaimed 
that "no phenomenon or event is produced without [a] cause; this is the sovereign 
and regulative principle of human reason, in the investigation of real facts" [9, 
53]. Rather, the revisionists grounded the reality of chance in another Laplacean 
dictum about ontology, this time about he nature ofhasard: what we call "chance" 
is not randomness, but rather the interaction of uniform, constant causes with 
variable causes. In the long run regularity emerges as "the variable causes of this 
irregularity produce effects alternatively favorable and contrary to the regular 
course of events . . ,  mutually destroying one another in a large number of trials" 
[29, xlvii]. 
Reflections of this image of constant causes ultimately triumphing over the 
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fluctuations of variable ones can be found in the writings of almost all 8 of the 
revisionists, although they differed wildly as to whether itwas a regulative principle 
of human reasoning, a mathematical theorem, or a fact derived from experience. 
Poisson's notion of chance approximated a constant underlying cause, while 
hasard encompassed "the collection of all causes which concur in the production 
of an event, without influencing the magnitude of its change" [36, 79-80]; Cournot 
described "fortuitous events" as the superimposition f independent causal chains 
[9, 55]; Mill reduced chance to the "composition of Causes . . .  [where] we have 
now one constant cause, producing an effect which is successively modified by 
a series of variable causes" [31, 7:530]. But whereas Laplace took his model to 
be a warrant (and even a moral imperative, in the case of the principles of sound 
government [29, xlviii-xlix]) for ignoring the effects of chance (in his sense of 
perturbations), the revisionists took it as a warrant for the real existence of 
chance. 
What made it possible for the revisionists to reconcile the real existence of 
chance with watertight determinism? They rejected randomness with as much 
finality as Laplace--or for that matter, Jakob Bernoulli and De Moivre--had; 
moreover, they took over Laplace's ontological model of the fortuitous lock, 
stock, and barrel. But they imposed upon both determinist convictions and onto- 
logical model a new philosophical grid, Kantian in its inspirations if not in its 
substance, that divided the stable, external, "objective" world from the variable, 
internal, "subjective" world. Within the framework of classical probabilities 
causes and reasons had been systematically conflated, just as within 18th-century 
associationist psychology, experience and belief had been equally systematically 
linked [12, 191-210]. The distinction between objective and subjective which also 
emerged ca. 1840 destroyed the plausibility of any smooth meshing between the 
world of things and the world of the mind. This was not merely scepticism redux, 
for the champions of objectivity were buoyantly confident of human abilities to 
know the world of things. Nor was it simply a renewed warning against the 
Baconian idols of cave, tribe, marketplace, and theater: the main threat posed by 
subjectivity was not distortion but variability, and no one looked to the methods 
of "Tables of Essence and Presence" or "Prerogative Instances" as a suitable 
defense. When Cournot worried about "modifications" introduced by the differing 
viewpoints of observers [9, 125], or when Ellis thundered that probabilities cannot 
"be taken as the measure of any mental state" [18, 3], they were not simply 
affirming empiricism. On the contrary, both, as we have seen, argued vigorously 
for the centrality of regulative mental principles and a priori axioms of the mind 
to the precepts and practice of mathematical probability theory. Their target was 
not the mind per se--mental universals and regulative principles of thought were 
8 Bolzano is the one exception here, for his probabilities applied to the certainty of propositions 
and only indirectly and elliptically to the reality of events [5, 3:274, sect. 317]. But even Bolzano 
seems to have implicitly subscribed to such a model, claiming that if all circumstances for subsequent 
casts of a die were truly identical, then "not only 'no man' but God himself could not give grounds" 
why different faces turned up [5, 3:273, sect. 317]. 
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still revered, as we have seen in the cases of Ellis and Cournot--but rather all 
that was idiosyncratic or variable in the mind. 
This was the new core meaning of subjective: a capricious, arbitrary quality of 
the mind, responsible for not only inter- but also intra-individual differences. In 
contrast, the variability of irregular causes did not disturb the revisionist probabi- 
lists, for none of them believed that such fluctuations could, in the long run, 
occlude the constant causes that probabilities really measured. Much less did they 
believe that objective chance, defined in terms of causal variability, could topple 
the iron regime of determinism. Against his background it is perhaps not surprising 
that randomness first became thinkable when Gustav Theodor Fechner's psycho- 
physical parallelism challenged not only this double standard of variability, but 
also the philosophical distinction between inner and outer experience [26]. It was 
this distinction that had made the objective probabilities of ca. 1840 suddenly 
conceivable, without abandonment ofthe determinism which had made subjective 
probabilities eemingly inevitable in the classical theory. 
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